Section 13 - Causing an event

(1) A person who intentionally causes an involuntary agent to cause an event, shall be deemed to have caused the event.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “involuntary agent” means an animal or any other thing, and also a person who is exempted from liability to punishment for causing the event, by reason of infancy, or insanity, or otherwise, under a provision of this Act.

(3) Where an event is caused by the acts of several persons acting jointly or independently, each of those persons who intentionally or negligently contributed to cause the event has, for the purposes of this Act, and, subject to subsections (4) and (5) and to the provisions of this Part with respect to abetment, caused the event; but a matter of exemption, justification, extenuation, or aggravation which exists in the case of any one of those persons shall have effect in favour of that one person, whether it exists or not in the case of any of the other persons.

(4) A person shall not be convicted of having intentionally or negligently caused an event if, irrespective of the act of that person and the acts of any of the persons acting jointly with that person, the event would not have happened but for the existence of a state of facts, or the intervention of any other event or of any other person, the probability of the existence or intervention of which other event or person the accused person did not take into consideration, and did not have a reason to take into consideration.

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply where a person is charged with having caused an event by an omission to discharge a duty for averting the event.

(6) A person beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts, who causes a voluntary agent to cause an event within the jurisdiction, shall be deemed to have caused the event within the jurisdiction.

(7) Subject to this section, and to the special provisions of a particular section of this Act, it is a question of fact whether an event is fairly and reasonably to be ascribed to a person’s act as having been caused by that act.

(8) A person shall not, by reason of anything in this section, be relieved

(a) from a liability in respect of an attempt to cause an event; or

(b) from a liability in respect of a negligent conduct, if the negligent conduct is punishable under this Act irrespective of whether it actually causes an event.

Illustrations

Subsection (1)

1. A gives poisoned sweetmeats to a child, who eats some and gives the rest to other children. A has poisoned the first child and the other children.

2. A induces a child under twelve years to steal a thing for A. A has stolen the thing.

3. A induces a madman to kill himself. A has killed the madman.

4. A causes a dog to harm B. A has caused the harm to B.

Subsection (3) A railway collision is caused partly by the neglect of A, a station master, to signal a train; partly by the neglect of B, a pointsman, to arrange the points; partly by the carelessness of C, D, E, and F, the drivers and guards of the train. A, B, C, D, E, and F, have each caused the collision, although it would not have happened if any one of them had used proper skill and care.

Subsection (4)

1. A rides a vicious horse in a crowd. B wantonly strikes the horse, and it kicks C. In this case, B, and not A, has caused the harm to C.

2. A, who is a signal-man improperly leaves his post. B, who is a trespasser, in A’s absence unlawfully alters the signals, and a collision ensues. A is punishable as for having negligently caused the collision by omission to attend to his duty. B is also punishable for having intentionally or negligently caused the collision.

Subsection (6) A, in Lagos, posts a letter to B in Accra, borrowing money from B on the credit of a cargo which A by the letter falsely represent that A has shipped for B. B sends the money on the faith of the representation. A has defrauded B in Accra.

Subsection (8) A shoots from a distance at B who is on horseback, with the intent to maim B. B’s horse is startled by the shot and throws B, who is killed by the fall. Here, by reason of the rule in subsection (4), A cannot be convicted of having intentionally or negligently killing B (unless A expected, or had reason to expect, that B’s horse would be startled). But A is punishable for the attempt to kill B.